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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW
Donald J. Simon*

The Watergate scandal of the early seventies spawned a number of
reforms in the operation of the federal government and in the policing
of its highest officials. Strict regulations, for instance, were imposed
on the role of money in political campaigns, 1 ethics codes were enacted
in the two houses of Congress, 2 and government agencies were directed
to conduct their business in public. 3 In addition, a new system was
established to investigate and prosecute misconduct by high government officials. This system - involving the appointment of temporary
special prosecutors independent of the normal prosecutorial power in
the Justice Department 4 - was designed to ensure that those who control the law can also be made subject to it.
Five years after its passage, the special prosecutor law still comes
under frequent attack. The Reagan Administration has been one of
the foremost critics of the law, charging that it is unnecessary, unfair,
and expensive. 5 Congress has recently considered these and other
criticisms of the law, and enacted some revisions to it, although the
basic special prosecutor mechanism has been left substantially intact. 6
* Associate, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Guido, -Washington, D.C. Former Associate General
Counsel, Common Cause, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1975, J.D., 1978, Harvard University. The
author was co-counsel for Common Cause as amicus curiae in Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952
(D.D.C. dismissed March 24, 1981), a case challenging the constitutionality of the special prosecutor law. See infra notes 7, 75-76, 92.
I. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U .S.C. (1976 & Supp. V
1981)); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
2. See S. Doc. No. 97-1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-73 (1981) (Senate Standing Rules 34-42);
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 26 (1982) (Rule 43,
House Code of Official Conduct).
3. See Government in the Sunshine Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (Supp. IV 1980).
4. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. Supp. V 1981).
5. See Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Management of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) (letter of May 21, 1981 from Attorney General William French Smith
to Sen. William Cohen) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]; id. at 92 (testimony of Associate
Attorney General Rudolph W. Giuliani).
6. See The Ethics in Government Act, 1982 amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983). The special prosecutor law as enacted in 1978 contained an automatic termination, or
"sunset" provision, which provided that the law would expire on October 26, 1983, five years
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Not the least of the criticisms - made by both the Administration
and others - is that the special prosecutor law is unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of the law has never been adjudicated by a court,
although one case directly raised the issue. 7 Because of the importance
of the law, and the novelty of the constitutional questions it raises,
it is virtually certain that the courts will soon be presented with another
direct challenge to it. 8
This Article explores the constitutional questions posed by the special
prosecutor law and concludes that the law is constitutional. Part I examines the political setting that gave rise to the special prosecutor provisions and discusses the intent of the drafters. Part II explains the
precise manner in which the provisions operate and surveys the recent
experience under the law. Finally, part III evaluates the constitutional
objections raised by critics of the legislation.
I.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW

The special prosecutor law is part of the Ethics in. Government Act
of 1978 (the Ethics Act),9 a comprehensive congressional effort to
safeguard the integrity of the governmental process. That legislation
represented a landmark effort to instill public copfidence in the fair
and ethical behavior of public officials. 10
after its enactment, unless affirmatively re-enacted by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (Supp.
IV 1980). The recent amendments passed by Congress did re-enact the Jaw for an additional
five year period, in addition to making certain revisions described below. See infra text accompanying notes 35-68. Notwithstanding his Administration's stated opposition to the special prosecutor concept, President Reagan signed into law the 1982 amendments, including the five year
extension of the law.
7. The constitutionality of the Jaw was challenged by Timothy Kraft, former assistant to
President Carter. Mr. Kraft filed a civil action against a special prosecutor who was conducting
an investigation into allegations of drug use by Mr. Kraft. Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952
(D.D.C. dismissed March 24, 1981). The constitutional issues raised were not decided by the
court because the civil action was dropped after the special prosecutor concluded his investigation without bringing charges. See infra notes 75-76, 92 and accompanying text.
8. Indeed, a Senate Subcommittee considering revisions to the Act took critical note of the
Reagan Administration's statements doubting the constitutionality of the law. The Subcommittee noted that "[b)ecause of the reservations expressed by the Attorney General, the Subcommittee believes that it is virtually inevitable that the next subject of a special prosecutor investigation
will move to enjoin the special prosecutor on grounds that the provisions are unconstitutional."
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR PROVISIONS OF
THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978, at 21 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981). The Subcommittee also stated that the Attorney General's position
"will invite an immediate challenge to the Act the next time that it is invoked." Id. at I.
9. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1980)). The special prosecutor provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (Supp.
IV 1980).
I0. In addition to the special prosecutor provisions, the Ethics Act imposed financial disclosure
requirements on officials in the legislative branch, 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (Supp. IV 1980); the
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The Ethics Act was the product of the Watergate scandals, which
generated the most serious crisis of public confidence in government
in modern American history. Yet, notwithstanding the sense of urgency with which Congress and the public sought ways to ensure that a
similar crisis could be averted in the future, the special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics Act evolved through a process of careful congressional consideration extending over several years. 11 The result represents -a carefully conceived, pragmatic solution to specific problems exposed
by Watergate.
The Senate Watergate investigation that began in the fall of 1972
and culminated in President Nixon's resignation nearly two years later
exposed not only gross misconduct by high government officials, but
also impropriety and favoritism in the Justice Department's investigation
of that misconduct. 12 In several important ways, the exposure of these
wrongdoings demonstrated the need for some special arrangement to
deal with the problem of favoritism in the prosecution of high government officials.
First, the Watergate scandals underscored the inherent conflict of
interest created whenever officials in the Department of Justice attempt
to investigate or prosecute high-ranking members of the executive
branch. At bottom, the problem lies in the inevitable conflicts that
compromise, or appear to compromise, efforts by the Justice Department to conduct a fair ~nd impartial investigation of the President
and his closest advisers. The conflicts stem from the divided loyalties
inherent in the office of the Attorney General. On the one hand, the
Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice and the
executive branch, 5 U.S.C. app.I §§ 201-211 (1976); and the judicial branch, 28 U.S.C. app.
§§ 301-309 (Supp. IV 1980). The bill established an Office of Government Ethics to monitor
and enforce these disclosure requirements. 5 U.S.C. app.l §§ 401-405 (Supp. IV 1980). The legislation also enacted so-called "revolving door" provisions governing post-employment conflicts of
interest, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. IV 1980), and established an office of Senate Legal Counsel.
2 U.S.C. § 288 (Supp. Ill 1979).
·ll. See generally Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice: Hearings
on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2803); Watergate
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 Before the Senate
_Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975-1976); Provision for Special
Prosecutor: Hearings on H.R. 14476 et al., Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Special Prosecutor Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 2835 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977:
Hearings on S. 555 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
12. See S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-213 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
981); see also infra text accompanying notes 15-34. See generally Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearings on Watergate and Related Activities Before the Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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nation's chief law enforcer. On the other hand, he is a political appointee and the primary legal adviser to the President. These two roles
come into direct and often irreconcilable conflict in those cases where
it is the President or his close aides against whom the law must be
enforced. As former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
testified before the Senate, "The pressures, the tensions of divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as honorable and conscientious as
any individual might be, the public could never feel entirely easy about
the vigor and thoroughness with which the investigation was pursued.
Some outside person is absolutely essential." 13 Former U.S. Attorney
Whitney North Seymour succinctly stated the same sentiment in his
Senate testimony, noting that, "loyalty to the political interests of the
administration may often require disloyalty to the goal of impartial
justice." 14
Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on presidential Campaign Activities (the Senate Watergate Committee) revealed ample
evidence of such conflicts. It was shown, for instance, that throughout
the summer of 1972, and continuing until the spring of 1973, Henry
Petersen, chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, served
as a "conduit for a constant flow of information from the grand jury
and the prosecutors" to both presidential counsel John Dean and to
the President. 1 s Dean testified that Petersen informed him of the
witnesses that would be called before the grand jury, and what they
would be asked. 16 According to Dean, Petersen passed on the information because he was "a soldier." 11 As Dean phrased it, "[Petersen]
believed in you [the President] and he believes in this Administration.
This Administration made him. I don't think he ha[s] done anything
improper, but he did make sure that the investigation was narrowed
down ... which was a break for us." 18 On several occasions Petersen
even gave the President tactical advice as to ''the posture the White
House should strike during the investigation." 19
In April of 1973, Attorney General Kleindienst removed himself from
the Watergate case and Petersen assumed full responsibility for the
investigation. 20 Throughout April, Petersen continued to confer regularly
with the targets of his investigation. 21 The knowledge he imparted was
Hearings on S. 2803, supra note II, at 200.
Id. at 216.
S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 80.
EDITED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS 185 (March 21, 1973), quoted ins. REP. No. 981,
supra note 12, at 80.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 82; see also id. at 91-92.
20. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 254 (1975).
21. Petersen did not actually assume responsibility for the investigation until April 19, 1973.
See id. Petersen testified, however, that he spoke with the President as late as April 18, S. REP.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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used by the President and his advisers to formulate strategies in order
to counter the investigation. 22 Further, Petersen apparently reached an
agreement with White House officials early in the investigation that
the scope of the inquiry would be limited to the initial burgl_ary, and
would not extend into White House affairs. 23 The Senate Watergate
Committee concluded that Petersen's conduct in the Watergate investigation "raises a question as to whether high Department of Justice officials can effectively administer criminal justice when White House
personnel, or the President himself, are the subjects of the
investigation. " 24
The Watergate investigation underscored the need for a special prosecutor in a second and equally important manner by exposing the lack
of accountability to the public, and to the rule of law, that existed
within the Justice Department. It was apparent that the Justice Department in the Nixon Administration had become politicized to the point
of conspiring actively with the White House in abusing prosecutorial
power to advance political ends. Press reports in 1973, for example,
indicated that the FBI - a branch of the Justice Department - had
received orders from the White House to carry out wiretaps on newsmen
and government officials whose support of the President was suspect. 25
No. 981, supra note 12, at 94, and conversations between the President and counsel for White
House aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman strongly suggest that the President continued to confer
with Petersen even after the 19th, EDITED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS 1239-40 (April 19, 1973),
quoted in S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 94.
22. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 80-82.
23. Id. at 81.
24. Id. at 80. On April 30, 1973, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst resigned. President
Nixon nominated Elliot Richardson to take his place. During his confirmation hearings, Richardson
agreed to appoint an independent special prosecutor to take responsibility for the Watergate
investigation. On May 25, 1973, Archibald Cox was sworn in as Special Prosecutor and the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force was officially established. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 4-5, 254-55 (1975). With the creation of an independent prosecution force
under Cox, the potential for collusion was greatly diminished. Yet in October of the same year,
in the face of subpoenas by Cox for the release of tapes of Oval Office conversations, President
Nixon ordered his subordinates to fire the special prosecutor. Attorney General Richardson resigned
in protest, and Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus was fired when he too refused to carry
out the order. Acting Attorney General Robert Bork finally did fire Cox. The events of the
day were referred to by the press as the "Saturday Night Massacre."
While public outrage over the Cox firing was partially assuaged by White House guarantees
that the new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, would not be removed without consent of a
bipartisan coalition in the Congress, see Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legislation: Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d. Cong., I st Sess. I 75 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) [hereinafter
cited as Special Prosecutor Hearings fears persisted that the President had succeeded in replacing
Cox with "his own man," see id., at 176 (remarks of Chesterfield Smith, President, ABA);
see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1973, § I, at 40, col. I, quoted in Special Prosecutor Hearings,
supra note 24, at 239.
25. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 63-65 (1975). Testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities subsequently showed these reports
to be true. See S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 37-40.
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Moreover, the Watergate Special Prosecutor Force investigated charges
that during the spring of 1972 the Department of Justice, under the
direction of John Mitchell, 26 settled three antitrust suits against the
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) in return
for ITT's help in financing the 1972 Republican National Convention. 21
These charges resulted in the subsequent prosecution and conviction
for perjury of then Assistant Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. 28 Similarly, the Senate
Watergate Committee heard testimony that White House staff members
discussed the possibility of using the Justice Department's Antitrust
Division to punish the three major networks. 29 Testimony further revealed that Robert Maridan, then Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Internal Security Division within Justice, forwarded extensive
FBI investigative information to the White House and to the Committee to Re-Elect the President. 30
These activities raised the question whether high Justice Department
officials who themselves abused the law could be expected to hold their
peers or their superiors accountable. Many in Congress felt that some
outside check on the politicization of the Justice Department was needed
in order to prevent official corruption on the part of the very officials
whose duty it was to police and prosecute official corruption. As the
Senate Report on the 1978 Ethics Act noted: "[Nixon Administration
officials] made the ... assumption that 'their' Department of Justice
would not investigate actions condoned and conducted by employees
of the White House ... [T]he existence of the authority for the court
to appoint a temporary special prosecutor would be a deterrent to such
an attitude by high-level government officials." 31
Thus, Watergate dramatically revealed the fragility of a system of
government that relies on officials in positions of power to police
themselves. It made clear that without some outside check on officials,
it is possible for an unscrupulous President, with compliant subordinates
in the Justice Department, to commit "serious crimes" against the
government and the public at large. 32
26. The politicized nature of the Justice Department was epitomized by Mitchell himself,
who resigned as Attorney General in 1972 to head the Committee to Re-Elect the President.
See Hearings on S. 2803, supra note 11, at 2-3 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
27. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 57 (1975).
28. Id. at 60.
29. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 145.
30. Id. at 146.
31. S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977). See generally supra note II.
32. Whitney North Seymour, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
testified before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice that the damage that the White
House had inflicted upon the government and the public could be sorted into six categories:
(I) improper conduct during the 1972 re-election campaign; (2) improper communication between the White House and the federal bench; (3) improper use of executive clemency; (4) im-
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Finally, Watergate revealed that if public confidence in government
was to be restored and maintained, remedying the actual conflict of
interest in Justice Department prosecution of high officials was not
enough; the appearance of impropriety and favoritism had to be removed as well. The Senate Report on the Ethics Act concluded that,
"The appearance of conflict is as dangerous to public confidence in
the administration of justice as true conflict itself. Having men of integrity operate in the face of a conflict is an insufficient protection
for a system of [j]ustice. " 33 One witness testifying in support of the
special prosecutor law said, "We must not only do justice, but be able
to assure the public that justice has been done." 34
II.

THE OPERATION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW

A.

The Statutory Mechanism

As the Watergate scandal unfolded, the public reaction produced
a clear mandate: practical legislative steps had to be taken to ensure
that executive abuse of the public trust did not occur again. 35 Inspired
by ''the greatest mass outpouring of public protest in our history,'' 36
members of the House and Senate considered a variety of proposals
designed to impose independent checks on the activities of high executive officials and to alleviate favoritism in the investigation of official
misconduct. Committees in both houses considered proposals ranging
from placing the Justice Department wholly outside the executive
branch, 37 to establishing a permanent special prosecutor for all official
misconduct. 38
The solution finally adopted by Congress was to provide a mechanism
--•---------

- ----------

proper use of federal investigative agencies; (5) -interference with the proper functioning of the
Office of Attorney General; (6) misuse of national security powers. Special Prosecutor Hearings,
supra note 24, at 193.
33. S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 3 I, at 6.
34. Id. at 6.
35. The Senate Watergate Committee concluded that "unmonitored executive investigative
and prosecutorial agencies may be reluctant to expose wrongdoing in the executive branch",
S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 96, and therefore submitted to the Senate as one of its final
recommendations the creation of an independent Public Attorney's Office, analogous in some
respects to a special prosecutor, "to investigate and prosecute where conflicts of interest in the
executive branch exist." See id. at 96-100. Similarly, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
in its Final Report, concluded that "No one who has watched 'Watergate' unfold can doubt
that the Justice Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting high officials, or that
an independent prosecutor is freer to act according to politically neutral principles of fairness
and justice." WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 137-38 (1975).
36. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 24, at 153 (remarks of Rep. Moss).
37. S. 2803, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess., (1973).
38. S. 495, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (1975).
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for the appointment of temporary special prosecutors. 39 Although this
mechanism is established as an ongoing feature of the law enforcement authority of the federal government, 40 the office of any particular
special prosecutor is of temporary duration. The office comes into being
in order to investigate a discrete set of allegations of wrongdoing by
an official, 41 and the office expires when that investigation and any
concomitant prosecution is completed. 42
The special prosecutor mechanism is triggered whenever the Attorney
General "receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to
investigate' ' 43 that any person within a class of high executive officials
defined by statute44 has committed a violation of federal criminal law. 45
The Attorney General then has discretion to conduct, for a period not
to exceed ninety days, a preliminary investigation of the matter as he
"deems appropriate. " 46 In determining whether grounds to investigate
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983). The 1982 amendments to the Ethics Act changed the term used by the Act from "special
prosecutor" to "independent counsel." Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). The reason
for the change, as explained in the Senate Report on the Amendments, was to diminish the
pejorative Watergate connotations that attach to the term "special prosecutor":
The Subcommittee believes, however, that much of the adverse publicity resulting from
a special prosecutor investigation could be diminished by simply changing the name
from "special prosecutor" to "independent counsel." This change would remove the
Watergate connotation of a special prosecutor investigation and would help spare the
subject of such an investigation adverse public reaction. Equally important, the name
"independent counsel" more accurately indicates that the investigation is being handled
outside of normal government channels by an impartial investigator.
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 2. Notwithstanding this recent change in the Jaw,
this Article will continue to use the term "special prosecutor" because it more accurately reflects
the current public understanding of the office.
40. The special prosecutor provisions however, as noted above, are subject to a five-year
automatic termination provision. 28 U.S.C. § 598 (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 6.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
44. The limited set of officials subject to the special prosecutor provisions includes only the
President, Vice President, Cabinet officers, high officials in the White House, Justice Department, the Internal Revenue Service and the Central Intelligence Agency, and ranking officers
of the President's national campaign committee. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). This encompasses a total of approximately
125 individuals. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 31. The 1982 amendments
made minor changes to this list, narrowing somewhat the number of officials encompassed by
the Act and shortening the period of time during which an official is covered after he leaves
office. See Pub. L. No, 97-409, § 3, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
In addition, the Attorney General may seek appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate
allegations of criminal wrongdoing by individuals other than those specified in the statute where
the Attorney General determines that an investigation by him "may result in a personal, financial or political conflict of interest." 28 U.S.C. § 59l(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
45. The Act encompasses misdemeanors and felonies, but excludes petty offenses. 28 U.S.C.
§ 59l(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
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exist, the Attorney General may consider both the specificity of the
information received and the credibility of the source of the information. 47 If the Attorney General concludes after investigation that there
are ''reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted, " 48 the matter must be referred to the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals for appointment of a special prosecutor. 49
The Ethics Act establishes a three-judge panel of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over matters concerning the appointment and removal of the special prosecutor. 50 That
2039 (1983). Upon a showing of "good cause," the special prosecutor division of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals may grant the Attorney General a single 60-day extension of
the time for the preliminary investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 593(f) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
47. 28 U .S.C. § 592(a)(I) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
2039 (1983). This provision was added by the 1982 amendments. Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 4(b),
96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983). If the Attorney General determines that no reasonable grounds for further investigation
exist, he must notify the appropriate division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
and the matter ends. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(I) (Supp. IV 1980).
This standard reflects a considerable broadening of the Attorney General's discretion accomplished by the 1982 amendments. As originally enacted, the Attorney General was required to
begin a preliminary investigation whenever he received "specific information" that a covered
official had violated the law. The original statute gave the Attorney General little or no discretion to evaluate the weight or credibility of the allegation. Further, as originally enacted, the
law required the Attorney General to yield to a special prosecutor whenever, after his preliminary
investigation, he could not conclude that "the matter is so unsubstantiated as not to warrant
further investigation or prosecution." 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(I) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409,
§ 4(c), 96 Stat. 2039 (1983)). The new law, in contrast, allows the Attorney Generar to weigh
the sufficiency of the evidence and decide if "reasonable grounds" exist for further investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(I) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. i039
(1983).
These changes were made in response to criticism that the threshold triggering mechanism
of the original law was too low, resulting in the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate
alleged criminal violations which are rarely prosecuted by the Justice Department. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Management of the Senate Comm. of Government
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 10 (1981) (testimony of Former Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti); id. at 58, 66 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann). The Senate Subcommittee that drafted
the 1982 amendments concluded that the original threshold standard "result[ed] in an uneven
administration of justice: one standard is applied to the citizenry at large, while another is applied to our public officials." SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981 supra note 8, at 48. The Subcommittee concluded that the appointment standard should be raised "[t]o lessen the inequities created
by the present low standard and to prevent needless special prosecutor investigations." Ii at
49. The Subcommittee stated that the higher standard would permit the Attorney General "to
exercise limited discretion in evaluating the results of the preliminary investigation . . . . " Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983). In addition, the Act is triggered whenever a majority of either the majority or the nonmajority party members of the Judiciary Committees of either House of Congress requests in
writing that the Attorney General seek appointment of a special prosecutor. 28 U.S.C. § 595(e)
(Supp. IV 1980). The Attorney General must, after conducting a preliminary investigation of
the matter, report back to the Committee in writing on his actions. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (Supp. IV 1980). The three judges are designated by the Chief Justice
of the United States and sit on the panel in this division for a two year period. 28 U.S.C. §
49(a), (d).
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division of the court, upon referral of a matter by the Attorney General,
is empowered to appoint a special prosecutor and to define the scope
of the prosecutor's investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction. s1
The powers of the special prosecutor, as well as several important
accountability features, are set forth in the statute. The investigative
powers include conducting grand jury proceedings, reviewing evidence
received, inspecting tax returns, compelling testimony, determining
whether to contest any privileges asserted by witnesses, and making
application to the courts with respect to grants of immunity for
witnesses. 52 The prosecutorial functions include framing and signing
indictments, filing informations, initiating and conducting prosecutions
and other necessary civil or criminal litigation, and determining whether
to appeal adverse decisions. 53 The special prosecutor may hire staff
to aid in performing the functions of the office, 54 and may seek the
assistance of the Department of Justice on matters within the jurisdiction of the investigation. ss
Several controls on the power of the special prosecutor are also provided in the Act. First, the scope of the appointee's prosecutorial
jurisdiction is circumscribed by court definition. 56 This definition in
turn is based upon the initial report of the Attorney General as to
matters which, in his belief, are substantiated sufficiently to warrant
further investigation or prosecution. 57 The special prosecutor has no
power to operate outside the scope of this limited jurisdiction or to
extend it unilaterally. ss
A second limitation on the activities of the special prosecutor lies
in a provision of the Act that states: "A special prosecutor shall, except where not possible, comply with the written policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws." 59 This
provision technically does allow the special prosecutor to deviate from
established Justice Department guidelines. Yet the intent of Congress
51. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
53. Id.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 594(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The Justice Department is required by statute to
provide any assistance requested by the special prosecutor. Id.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
58. He may, however, request the Attorney General or the division of the court. to refer
to him additional matters, but only if they are related to his original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 594(e) (Supp. JV 1980). The division of the court, upon the request of the Attorney General,
may expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (Supp. JV 1980).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
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is plainly that the special prosecutor should conform his discretion to
established principles and follow normal Justice Department practices.
As the Senate Report to the 1982 amendments stated, the intent of
this provision ''is to create a presumption that the special prosecutor
will follow prosecutorial guidelines. " 60
The third element of accountability is the statutory requirement that
the special prosecutor report to the appointing court on both the disposition of all cases brought and the reasons for not prosecuting any matter
within the jurisdiction of the office. 61 The court then has the discretion
to release that report to the Congress, the public, or to any appropriate
person. 62 Further, the prosecutor must "from time to time" send to
Congress statements or reports on his activities. 63 The special prosecutor
must also cooperate with House and Senate committees exercising oversight jurisdiction. 64
Finally, the statute provides that the special prosecutor may be removed by the Attorney General for "good cause" or for any disabling
condition which impairs the performance of his duties of office. 65
However, if the prosecutor is removed, the Attorney General must report
this promptly both to the court and to Congress. 66 Further, the special
prosecutor may contest removal by bringing a civil action against the
Attorney General. 67 That action is adjudicated before the division of
the court which appointed the prosecutor, and that court may order
the prosecutor's reinstatement or other appropriate relief. 68

60. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 53; see also s. REP. No. 95-170, supra
note 31, at 69-70.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 595(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 595(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
2039 (1983). The "good cause" standard for removal was added by the 1982 amendments. Pub.
L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). As originally enacted, the statute provided for removal
of the special prosecutor for "extraordinary impropriety" or "any other condition that substantially impairs ... performance." The Senate Report on the amendments notes that the original
standard "may present too many opportunities for the special prosecutor to abuse his authority." SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 54. Notwithstanding this weakening of the
law, however, the Subcommittee "stress[ed] that the Attorney General must use this removal
power in only extreme, necessary cases, as removal of a special prosecutor severely undermines
the public confidence in investigations of wrongdoing by public officials." Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
68. Id. In addition to the changes described above, the 1982 amendments also provided that
the court may award to the subject of a special prosecutor's investigation reimbursement for
all or part of the attorney's fees incurred by that person during the investigation, provided no
indictment is brought. Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 5, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 593(g) (Supp.
IV 1980). The purpose of this addition is to compensate the subject of an investigation for the
"extraordinary costs caused exclusively by this statute." SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note
8, at 27.
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Experience Under the Statute

To date, three special prosecutors have been appointed under the
Act, and in each of the three cases, the prosecutor has concluded that
no criminal charges should be brought against the subject of the investigation. The first appointment occurred after allegations were made
that White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan was using cocaine
in violation of federal law. 69 After a preliminary investigation required
by the Act, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti on November 19, 1979,
applied to the special prosecutor division of the District of Columbia
Circuit for the appointment of a special prosecutor. 10 On November
29, 1979, the court appointed Arthur H. Christy special prosecutor.
After a six month investigation, Christy, on May 28, 1980, submitted
a report to the court describing his investigation and stating his conclusion that the case against Jordan be closed. 11
The second appointment of a special prosecutor grew directly out
of the first. 12 In the report to the court on Hamilton Jordan, Christy
filed a confidential memorandum, which was transmitted to Attorney
General Civiletti, stating that allegations of drug possession had been
made against Timothy Kraft, then campaign manager of the CarterMondale Presidential Committee. 73 After a preliminary investigation,
the Attorney General requested the court to appoint another special
prosecutor. 74 On September 9, 1980, the court named Gerald Gallinghouse as special prosecutor. 7 5 Gallinghouse completed his criminal
investigation in March 1981 and concluded that no charges should be
69. The description of the special prosecutor's investigation into the Jordan matter is derived
from a summary in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981,
supra note 8, at 12-14. The allegations against Jordan grew out of a federal investigation into
alleged tax evasion by the owners of the Studio 54 discotheque in New York. After the two
owners were indicted for tax evasion in June 1979, they alleged to the U.S. Attorney's office
that Mr. Jordan had used cocaine at Studio 54 in June 1978.
70. The Attorney General noted that he was unable, after a preliminary investigation, to
conclude "that the matter is so unsubstantiated that no further investigation ... is warranted."
28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(l) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 4, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983)).
71. The information compiled by Special Prosecutor Christy during the six month investigation was submitted to a grand jury prior to the submission of the report to the court. On May
21, 1980, the grand jury voted not to bring charges.
72. The description of the special prosecutor's investigation into the Kraft matter is derived
from a summary in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments, SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981,
supra note 8, at 14-15.
73. Mr. Kraft was also subject to the provisions of the Special Prosecutor Act in his capacity
as former White House Appointments Secretary and former Assistant to the President for Personal and Political Coordination. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
74. The Attorney General made the request on August 26, 1980.
75. During the course of Special Prosecutor Gallinghouse's investigation, Kraft filed a civil
action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of the special prosecutor law and seeking to enjoin the investigation. Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. dismissed March 24, 1981).
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brought against Kraft. 76
The third appointment of a special prosecutor occurred in December
of 1981, when Leon Silverman was appointed by the court as special
prosecutor to investigate bribery allegations made against Secretary of
Labor Raymond Donovan. 77 Mr. Donovan himself called for the
appointment of a special prosecutor in order to quell the public controversy over the charges made against him. 78 After a six month investigation, Mr. Silverman concluded that there was insufficient evidence
to warrant the bringing of criminal charges against Mr. Donovan, and
the investigation was closed. 79
In addition to these three appointments of special prosecutors under
the Act, there have been at least six cases in which the Attorney General
has conducted a preliminary investigation after receiving information
of criminal misconduct by an official covered by the Act. 80 In all of
these cases the Attorney General concluded that the matter should be
dropped without appointment of a special prosecutor. 81 Because of the
Act's restrictions on public disclosure of such investigations, it is not
known which officials were involved or what charges were made in
these cases. 82
In each of the instances described above, the appointment of a special
prosecutor to investigate criminal charges against high-ranking officials
has succeeded in assuring the public that a fair and impartial investigation has taken place. Even where no charges have been brought, the
fact that exoneration came from an independent source rather than
from the Attorney General has increased public credibility in the outcome of the investigation. In commenting on the special prosecutor's
76. Kraft's civil action against the special prosecutor accordingly became moot, and was dismissed by the court on March 24, 1981. Kraft v. Gallinghouse, Order of March 24, 1981.
77. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
78. Id.
79. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
80. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 15-16.
81. Id.
82. The Act provides that if the Attorney General concludes, after a preliminary investigation, that there are no reasonable grounds to believe "further investigation or prosecution is
warranted," he shall so notify the court and submit to the court a summary of his investigation.
28 U .S.C. § 592(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). The statute provides that this notification of a preliminary
investigation shall not be made public without leave of court. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
The statute also provides that in cases where the Attorney General applies to the court for
appointment of a special prosecutor, the application and supporting documents shall not be made
public without leave of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 592(d)(2) (Supp. JV 1980). Upon appointment
of a prosecutor, the statute provides that his identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction shall be made
public "upon request of the Attorney General or upon a determination of the division of the
court that disclosure of the identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction of such special prosecutor
would be in the best interests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. JV 1980). It is therefore
possible, though unlikely, that there have been appointments of special prosecutors, other than
the three described above, which have not been made public. In any case, the statute requires
public disclosure of a special prosecutor's identity and jurisdiction when "any indictment is returned
or any criminal information is filed." Id.
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dismissal of allegations against Secretary Donovan, for instance, The
New York Times noted, "Th[e] law protects the public by guarding
against favoritism, and it can be a boon to officeholders by giving
them credible clearance when they deserve it. Would anyone have believed the same exoneration if it had come from Mr. Donovan's Cabinet
colleague, the Attorney General?" 83 Similarly, The Washington Post
cautioned against repeal of the law, noting that the special prosecutor
provision "has helped restore public confidence in the integrity of the
federal government. " 84 The Senate Subcommittee that conducted a
thorough review of the law's implementation concluded that the law
is fundamentally sound, and stated, ''By establishing a mechanism to
ensure impartial and thorough investigations of allegations against highranking Executive branch officials, the Act guards against both actual
and perceived conflicts of interest and assures the public that government officials are not above the law." 85 Finally, The New York Times,
on another occasion, invoked the use of a colloquialism to best sum
up the strong policy reasons for continuing the special prosecutor
mechanism. In an editorial, the Times wrote, ''Th[is] law protects officials and citizens alike from Government self-investigations that lack
credibility and heighten public distress. You trust your mother, but
you cut the cards. " 86
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Two broad constitutional challenges have been raised to the special
prosecutor provisions. First, it is argued that the mechanism for appointment of the special prosecutor violates the appointments clause
of the Constitution. 87 Proponents of this argument contend that the
special prosecutor is not an "inferior officer" of the United States,
that even if he is, he may not be appointed by a court of law, and
that even if he may be appointed by a court, the special prosecutor
division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is not a "court
of law" within the meaning of the appointments clause. The second
constitutional challenge relies on broader principles of separation of
powers, and claims that those considerations are a bar to the law's
goal of providing for a prosecutor free from the influence of the President, even in those cases where the prosecutor is empowered to investigate high aides or close associates of the President. According to this
view, it is a constitutional requisite that even in such cases, the Presi83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982, at A22, col. I.
Wash. Post, May 31, 1981, at 86, col. I.
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at I.
N.Y. Times, May 26, 1981, at A22, col. I.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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dent must control the initiation, direction, and termination of the
prosecution.
These attacks on the special prosecutor law invoke a rigid formalism
that does justice neither to the legitimate concerns of Congress nor
to the flexibility of the constitutional scheme. In fact, constitutional
arrangements are not so unyielding as these arguments contend. The
Supreme Court has expressly held that in matters involving the separation of powers, a "pragmatic, flexible approach" must control. 88 Such
an approach validates both the mechanism in the Ethics Act for appointment of the special prosecutor, and the statutory independence
which Congress has assured him in order that he may do his job.

A.

Appointments Clause Objections

The Ethics Act provides that a division of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit shall appoint the special prosecutor
upon referral of information by the Attorney General. 89 The Congress,
in establishing this mechanism, relied upon the language of the appointments clause of the Constitution, 90 which states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments. 91
·
Critics of the special prosecutor law have raised three objections under
the appointments clause to the statutory mechanism for appointment
of the special prosecutor. First, it is claimed that the special prosecutor
is riot an "inferior officer" and thus can be appointed only upon·
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. 92 Second,
the argument is made that, even if the special prosecutor is an "in88. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See Brief for Timothy Kraft at 11-12, Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. filed
Nov. 19, 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRAFT BRIEF) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
For general background to the Kraft case, see supra notes 7, 75-76, 92. The constitutional claims
made by Kraft are representative of those voiced by critics of the special prosecutor legislation.
For this reason the Kraft brief is cited frequently throughout the remainder of this Article.
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f erior officer," his appointment may not be vested by Congress
anywhere outside the executive branch. 93 Third, it is argued that even
if the special prosecutor's appointment may be vested in the "courts
of law," the panel of judges here vested with the appointment power
does not constitute such a "court. " 94
1. The special prosecutor as inferior officer- Article II, section
2, clause 2 of the Constitution provides for the appointment of certain
principal officers by the President alone, with confirmation by the
Senate, and the appointment of all other "inferior Officers" by the
"Courts of Law," the "Heads of Departments," or the "President
alone," as the Congress "think[s] proper. " 95 Thus, if the special prosecutor is held to be a principal officer, a federal statute vesting appointment power in a division of the District of Columbia Circuit Court
would be unconstitutional.
On its face, the appointments clause limits principal officers to those
enumerated: ambassadors, Supreme Court Justices, public ministers
and consuls. The first two categories are self-explanatory. The presentday meaning of the third category - ministers and consuls - is not
so clear, but evidence indicates that these officers are no more than
the heads of the various government departments and agencies. 96
A special prosecutor clearly does not rise to this status. Although
it is obvious that a special prosecutor is not the head of any department in name, critics have nonetheless argued that he should be considered a principal "Officer of the United States" because he has the
powers of a department head. As Kraft argued in his challenge to the
law, "[the prosecutor] acquires the power and authority of the Attorney General and he may, as he alone deems proper, create his own
mini-Department of Justice. " 97
In practice, however, this is an overstatement of the special prosecutor's power. To be sure, the authority and the independence he
possesses are broad; however, it is broad authority in an extremely
limited area. The prosecutor's duties and powers are statutorily limited
to a specific jurisdiction defined by the appointing court. 98 Unlike the
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 13.
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
96. Time has clouded the understanding of the terms "public ministers and consuls." At
the time the Constitution was drafted, a public minister was understood to be "a person appointed by the chief of state to act for him in a particular department of government; one entrusted with the administration of a department of state." 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 473
(1961). In modern political terms, a "public minister" is the head of a department or agency.
"Consul" was used to denote "an agent appointed and commissioned by a sovereign state to
reside in a foreign town or port, to protect the interests of its traders and other subjects there,
and to assist in all matters pertaining to the commercial relations between the two countries."
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 884 (1961).
97. KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 5.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 593 (Supp. IV 1980). Indeed, this jurisdiction is defined in the first instance
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head of a department, who is free to pursue any matter within the
broad confines of executive power, the special prosecutor is limited
to the exercise of his power within a single, specific investigation. 99
Even in that context, he must follow the guidelines of the Department
of Justice, which are ultimately determined by the Attorney General. 100
Moreover, the prosecutor is subject to oversight scrutiny by both the
Court and Congress, to which he must report on his activities and
judgments. 101 Finally, the special prosecutor is subject to removal by
the Attorney General on any grounds which constitute "good cause. " 102
In each of these respects, he is far more fettered than the Attorney
General or any other department head.
Because the special prosecutor does not exercise the power of a department head or other officer enumerated in article II, he must be treated
- for purposes of the appointments clause - as an inferior officer.
This point is clear from the language of the clause itself, which leaves
to the Congress the authority to create all other offices of the United
States beyond Supreme Court Justice, ambassador, consul and minister.
The clause then provides that ''Congress may by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers ... in the President alone, in the courts
of law, or in the heads of departments." 103 The language "such inferior officers" clearly refers back to the holders of all the additional
offices created by Congress; in other words, all officers other than
Justice, ambassador, consul, or minister. 104 Thus, simply by construing the language of the clause, inferior officers are those who hold
an office that is created by statute and that is below the rank of department head. The special prosecutor falls within this large group.
Judicial interpretation of the appointments clause supports this construction. The Supreme Court first discussed the issue of the demarcation between principal and inferior officers in United States v.
Germaine. 105 There the question was whether a surgeon retained on
an ad hoc basis by the Commissioner of Pensions was an officer of
the United States or simply an employee. 106 Because the surgeon was
on the basis of an investigation and report conducted by a department head, the Attorney General.
28 U.S.C. § 593 (Supp. IV 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 35-68.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 595 (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
104. Any other interpretation does injustice to the language of the provision, since it would
leave the term "such" as surplus language, a result which cannot rationally be assumed. United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
105. 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
106. That line of demarcation has been considered by the Court on several occasions. See
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to serve only when summoned by the Commissioner of Pensions and
was to be paid only on a fee-for-service basis, the Court found him
to be an employee. 101 In the course of its opinion defining the line
of demarcation between officers and employees, however, the Court
stated that "[t]he Constitution ... divides its officers into two classes.
The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But . . . in regard to officers inferior to those
specially mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment
... in the courts of law, or ... the heads of departments." 108 The
Court thus took the position - consistent with the language of the
appointments clause - that "inferior officers" are those ranking
beneath the officers expressly enumerated in the Clause, or in terms
relevant there, those beneath the heads of departments. 109
Collins v. United States, 110 decided by the Court of Claims the year
before the Germaine case, adds further weight to this view. In Collins,
the issue was Congress's authority to delegate to the President alone
the power to reappoint a major in the army. The Court of Claims
found the delegation of authority for Collins's reinstatement to be in
conformity with the appointments clause's provisions for inferior officers. In interpreting the phrase "inferior officers," the Court stated
that ''the Constitution leaves it to Congress to vest in the President
alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments the appointment
of any officer inferior or subordinate to them . . . . " 111 Here, too,
the court's conclusion is plainly that inferior officers are those ranking below the enumerated ones. 112
Critics of the special prosecutor law have cited Buckley v. Valeo 113
for the proposition that the special prosecutor is not an ''inferior officer'' and therefore must be appointed by the President and confirmed
also Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (merchant appraiser was not an officer);
United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 531 (1888) (customs clerk was not an officer).
107. The Court noted that the duties exercised by the surgeon were "occasional and intermittent." 99 U.S. at 512. While it is true th&t the special prosecutor under the Ethics Act is not
a permanent prosecutor, see supra text accompanying notes 39-42, the magnitude and independence
of his position makes it plain that he is more than a mere employee.
108. 99 U.S. at 509-10 (emphasis added).
109. Edwin Corwin, in his commentaries on the Constitution, agreed with this analysis, stating
"[i)nferior officers' are evidently officers subordinate to the heads of departments or the courts
of law . . . . " E. CORWIN. THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 145 (1973).
110. 14 Ct. Cl. 568 (1878).
111. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
112. Although the inference raised by language of the case is that the appointing authority
must be vested in all instances in a superior official of the same branch, that point is clearly
dispelled by Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902,
912 (D.D.C. 1967). See also infra text accompanying notes 124-135. The actual holding of the
Court of Claims - that inferior 'officers are all those officers below the rank of the enumerated
officers - is borne out by the Supreme Court's views in the Germaine case. See supra text
accompanying note 105.
113. 424 U.S. l (1976).
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by the Senate. 114 In Buckley, the issue was whether Congress could
vest appointment of Federal Election Commissioners in the President
(with the consent of the Senate and House), in the Speaker of the House,
and the President pro tempore of the Senate. The Court held that none
of these appointment methods for Commissioners was sanctioned by
article II of the Constitution. 115 Because the Commissioners were found
to exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States," the Court ruled that they were "officers" and thus must be
appointed according to one of the several methods prescribed in the
appointments clause. 116
The Court in Buckley did not rule - nor did it have to rule on the question of whether the Commissioners ~ere principal or inferior officers. The Court did not even address that question. Rather,
in Buckley, the Court distinguished officers - both principal and inferior - from those who are not officers.i 11 The Court in Buckley
said only that the Federal Election Commissioners were officers - either
principal or inferior - and thus had to be appointed according to
one of the methods under article II, although it did not say which
method.
Thus, although Buckley supports the proposition that an appointee
exercising "significant authority" is an officer rather than an employee
of the United States - and hence the proposition that a special prosecutor is an "officer" of the United States - it offers no support
for the assertion that the special prosecutor is a principal officer and
must therefore be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Buckley proves only that the special prosecutor is
either a principal or an inferior officer of the United States, but not
which. That question, the critical one, is answered by the appointments
clause, both on its face and as interepreted by the Germaine and Collins
cases. As an appointee ranking below a department head, and below
a "consul" or "minister," the special prosecutor is an inferior officer
of the United States. Congress, therefore, has the discretion, "as they
think proper," to vest his appointment "in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 118
2. Delegation to the courts under the appointments clause- Critics
of the special prosecutor law maintain that even if the special prosecutor is held to be an inferior officer, the appointments clause does
not allow Congress to vest his selection in the courts. This argument
114. See KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 11.
115. 424 U.S. at 124-25, citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.?116. 424 U.S. at 125-26, citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
117. In Buckley, the Court drew a line similar to the one it had previously drawn in Germaine. In Germaine, officers were differentiated from employees, while in Buckley they were
distinguished from legislative functionaries.
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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is based not on the language of the clause - for the language expressly
allows Congress to vest the appointment in the courts - but rather
arises by implication based on principles of separation of powers.
Specifically, it is contended that if Congress is permitted to vest appointment of the special prosecutor in the judiciary, there is nothing
to prevent an "emasculation [of] the separation of powers between
the three branches of government by requiring, for example, 'Inferior'
judicial officers to be appointed by heads of executive departments
and 'Inferior' executive officers to be appointed by the Judiciary." 119
As an initial matter, any attempt to impose substantial restrictions
on Congress's discretion here should be viewed with disfavor. By the
language of the clause, Congress is accorded wide latitude in determining where to vest the power to appoint inferior officers. Three
options are set out - the President, the courts of law, or the heads
of departments. Congress may choose among the three "as they think
proper:" 120 Justice Story, in his commentaries on the Constitution,
remarked on the scope of this discretion: "[i]f any discretion should
be allowed, its limits could hardly admit of being exactly defined; and
it might fairly be left to congress to act according to the lights of experience. It is difficult to foresee ... all the combinations of circumstances, which might vary the right to appoint. . . . " 121
I 19. KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 12. See also Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10937
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 343-49 (1973) (Statement of Robert C. Cramton, Dean, Cornell Law School)
hereinafter cited as Cramton Hearings. Dean Cramton argues that the "inferior officers" clause
was designed "to allow the appointment of subordinate officials of particular branches of the
government to be placed in the heads of those branches" and that "it is apparent that one branch
cannot be given the sole appointive authority of important officials of another branch." Id.
at 344, citing Ex Porte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839).
120. The last clause of the provision says that Congress "may" vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the President, the courts, or the heads of departments. Thus Congress has
a fourth alternative available - to require that particular inferior officers be appointed in the
same manner as principal officers, i.e., nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Congress has chosen that method for many inferior officers. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
121. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 394-98 (3d
ed. 1858). The broad discretion given to Congress by the "inferior officer" provision is supported by the history of the appointments clause. As originally proposed, the clause vested in
the President alone the power to appoint all officers not provided for in the Constitution. 1
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 226, 230, 236 (1934)
(Virginia Plan), 244 (New Jersey Plan), 63, 67 (Committee of the Whole, June I, 1787), 22,
33, 117, 121, 132, 141 (Convention, July 17 and 26, 1787). This delegation of unlimited authority
to the President met with strong objection. A subsequent draft recommended that Senate confirmation be required for all officers of the United States unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 499 (1934).
Changes were made to ensure that the President could make no appointment to an office which
was not created either by the Constitution or by Congress. Id. at 405, 621. The "inferior officers" provision itself reflects the tension between the executive and legislative branches. Id.
at 627-28. Although Congress may not vest the power to appoint inferior officers within itself,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 127 (1976), it nonetheless retains authority to select the appointing
body from among the President, the heads of departments, and the courts of law.
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There is no case support for the contrary contention that an inferior
officer can be appointed only by the head of the branch of government in which he is to serve. Indeed, there is no case holding invalid
any appointing power vested by Congress in the courts. On numerous
occasions the Court has expressly upheld such delegations, both when
the appointed officer is directly concerned with the court administration of justice 122 as well as when he is not. 123
More explicit guidance for determining the proper scope of Congress's discretion under the appointments clause has been offered by
the Supreme Court. In Ex Parle Siebold, 124 the Court established a
"congruity" or "propriety" test to govern the delegation to the judiciary
of the power to appoint election supervisers. The Court held that Congress may freely exercise its constitutional discretion to vest the power
of appointment so long as there is no "incongruity" to its choice. 125
The Court noted that "[i]t is ... usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government . . .
to which the duties of such officers appertain. But there is no absolute
requirement ... in the Constitution ... [T]he selection of the appointing
power . . . rests in the discretion of Congress." 126
Since Siebold, it has been squarely held that Congress may vest the
power to appoint prosecutors in the courts. In United States v.
122. See Ex Parle Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (clerks of the District Courts); Birch
v. Steele, 165 F. 577 (5th Cir. 1908) (referees in bankruptcy).
123. See Ex Parle Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (supervisors of elections); Rice v. Ames,
180 U.S. 371 (1901); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (United States
Commissioners); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (United States
Attorneys); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (District of Columbia school
board members). In all these cases, the courts rejected extreme limitations on Congress's discretion in vesting the power of appointment of inferior officers.
Moreover, in recent years, decisions concerning the general discretionary powers of federal
prosecutors have not read those powers so expansively as to preclude the possibility of court
appointment. See United States v. Crook, Crim. No. 151-72 (D.D.C., Oct. 27, 1972) (order denying motion to dismiss perjury charges); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, Civ. No. 1960 (D. Me., filed June 2, 1972) cited in Note, The Special Prosecutor in
the Federal System: A Proposal, II AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 597 (1973). Similarly, there is
considerable precedent among the state courts for vesting the appointment of a special prosecutor
in the judicial branch in cases where the conflict of interest falls within the protected area of
"'improper or corrupt motivation.'" See id. at 586, (quoting People v. Municipal Court, 7
Cal. 3d 645, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1972)).
124. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
125. Id. at 398.
126. Id. at 397-98. The Court added:
[T)he duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by law, is a constitutional
duty of the courts; and in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty
required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.
It cannot be affirmed that the appointment of the officers in question could, with any
greater propriety, and certainly not with equal regard to convenience, have been assigned
to any other depository of official power capable of exercising it. Neither the President,
nor any head of department, could have been equally competent to the task.
Id. at 398.
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Solomon, 121 the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute empowering the courts to appoint U.S. Attorneys when vacancies occur. 128 The
court there relied upon Siebold in concluding that the doctrine of separation of powers, "never rigidly engrafted upon the Constitution," must
be "subordinated to the particular provisions [of article II] as to methods
of appointment." 129 Similarly, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 130 the Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to vest the
courts with the power to appoint United States Commissioners. Among
the duties of the Commissioners was the power "to institute prosecutions under laws relating to the elective franchise . . . " 131 Despite
the fact that these officers exercised· prosecutorial power, the Court
upheld judicial appointment under the "inferior officers" provision
of the appointments clause. 132
Applying the Siebold test of "congruity" to the special prosecutor
question, it is clear there is nothing incongruous about vesting a court
with power to appoint an independent prosecutor. As in Siebold, "[i]t
cannot be affirmed that the appointment ... [of the special prosecutor]
could, with any greater propriety ... have been assigned to any other
depository of official power capable of exercising it." 133 A prosecutor,
unlike a general or a diplomat, is an officer of the court, a counsel
to the grand jury, and as such, is subject to the disciplinary power
of the court. 134 Courts are certainly familiar with the qualities that make
a good prosecutor; indeed, courts habitually exercise a similar kind
of judgment in appointing lawyers to represent indigent parties in
criminal proceedings. 1 3 5
127. 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N. Y. 1963).
128. Id. at 843. See 28 U.S.C. § 546 (Supp. IV 1980).
129. 216 F. Supp. at 840-41. The appropriateness of vesting appointment of the special prosecutor in the courts may rest on even firmer footing than court appointment of temporary United
States Attorneys as upheld in Solomon. The U.S. Attorney appointed by the courts, although
his tenure may be terminated once the President and Senate agree to a permanent replacement,
assumes all of the powers of the prosecutorial office, regardless of subject matter. The special
prosecutor, in contrast, has jurisdiction over only a limited subject matter which is defined by
the appointing court. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (Supp. IV 1980). See also United States v. Mitchell,
136 F. 896 (C.C.D. Or.) (upholding judicial appointment of U.S. Attorney) writ of error dismissed,
199 U.S. 616 (1905).
130. 282 U.S. 344, 352 n.l, 353 (1931).
131. Id. at 353 n.2.
132. Id. at 352-53. See also Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901) (upholding the constitutionality of judicial appointment of commissioners).
133. Ex Porte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879) (emphasis added).
134. See United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 704 (W.D. La. 1949); Charge to the
Grand Jury, 12 F.R.D. 495, 498 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
135. See generally Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965
(1979) (courts have discretion to appoint counsel in a criminal case where circumstances indicate
accused is impoverished); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961) (courts have discretion to determine if appointed attorney has rendered effective
assistance to his client).
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Nevertheless, objections persist that because the special prosecutor
is engaged in the enforcement of federal criminal laws, it is more appropriate to vest appointment in the executive. 136 In addition, critics
argue that ''the appointment of a special prosecutor would impose an
incongruous duty upon courts because of the danger that it would tarnish
the neutrality of the judiciary and assign it prosecutorial duties." 137
Yet "incongruity" would result not from the law as it now stands,
but rather from any contrary arrangement in the executive branch. It
plainly would be "incongruous" for the Attorney General to appoint
a special prosecutor charged with investigating and prosecuting the President or his close associates. It is precisely in those instances that the
Attorney General has the clearest conflict of interest, and that the integrity and independence of his prosecutorial power are most called
into question. Indeed, the episodes of collusion between the Justice
Department and the White House during Watergate conclusively
demonstrated the impropriety of entrusting the investigation of high
executive officials to high officials in the executive branch. 138 As Archibald Cox testified before the Senate: "the incongruity is in the top
of the executive branch investigating itself." 139
Thus, to read the Constitution as requiring the Attorney General
to appoint special prosecutors not only defeats the essential point of
the Ethics Act, but inevitably results in the very incongruity and illogic that the appointments clause seeks to avoid. In short, the Constitution grants Congress broad discretion in vesting the power to appoint inferior officers. In the case of special prosecutors, Congress has
exercised that discretion with wisdom, with logic, and with clear
congruity. 140
136. See Note, The Proposed Court-Appointed Special Prosecutor: In Quest of a Constitutional Justification, 87 YALE L.J. 1692, 1698 n.28 (1978). Some opponents of court appointment argue that "a most appropriate" test, first suggested in Ex Porte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 230, 258 (1839), should be applied, rather than the "congruity" test of Ex Porte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879). Cramton Hearings, supra note 119, at 350. See also A. Bickel, On
the Special Prosecutor, YALE L. REP .. Winter 1974, at 24; Baker, The Proposed Judicially Appointed Independent Office of Public Attorney: Some Constitutional Objections and an Alternative, 29 Sw. L.J. 671, 675 (1975). See generally 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 92-132
(testimony of Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice); Kramer,
Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals for 1983 66 MINN. L. REV. 963 (1982).
137. See Note, supra note 136, at 1699 n.28, citing Baker, supra note 136.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 9-34.
139. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 24, at 315-316 (remarks of Archibald Cox).
140. A number of constitutional scholars have concluded that Congress may vest the courts
with the power to appoint special prosecutors. Professor Tribe, in his treatise, directly addressed
this question and dismissed any objections: "[A] special judicial commission could properly be
created and charged with the duty of selecting an independent agent for the investigation and
prosecution of illegal acts by the President or the President's subordinates." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 n.4 (1978). Other scholars agree. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 14476,
supra note 11, at 162 (testimony of Archibald Cox); Hearings on Special Prosecutor (1973),
supra note II, at 341 (testimony of Prof. Paul Freund); id. at 319 (testimony of Prof. Philip
Kurland).
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3. The special prosecutor division as a court of law- Critics of
the special prosecutor law proffer one final argument with respect to
the constitutionality of the appointment of special prosecutors. The
division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals charged by statute
to appoint special prosecutors is not, it is argued, a "court of law"
within the meaning of the appointments clause. 141 Rather, it is claimed
that the three judge division 142 is an ad hoc group of judges gathered
together solely to appoint an executive official. Insofar as the panel
does not adjudicate cases and controversies, critics contend, it is not
a court of law. 143
This argument, however, is premised upon a misunderstanding of
the law. The Ethics Act expressly provides that if the Attorney General
for any reason removes the special prosecutor from office, the prosecutor "may obtain judicial review of the removal in a civil action
commenced before the division of the court and, if such removal was
based on error of law or fact, may obtain reinstatement or other appropriate relief." 144 The statute further provides that the court shall
cause such an action to be in every way expedited. 145
Thus, the special prosecutor division of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals does adjudicate cases. Congress has great discretion
to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, or divisions thereof,
as it sees fit. 146 Therefore, the fact that Congress limited the article
Ill jurisdiction of a division of the District of Columbia Circuit Court
to but one type of controversy - dismissal of special prosecutors is of no import in determining whether or not that division is a "court."
The division will be held to be a court if it is established by Congress
pursuant to its power under article III, if it adjudicates "cases or controversies" under article III, and if its judges enjoy article III protections.147 Because these conditions plainly apply to the special prosecutor
division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, this division
of the Circuit Court is in every sense a constitutional court, albeit one
with a narrow jurisdiction. As a "court of law" established pursuant
141. KRATT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 13-14.
142. The three judge division is required by 28 U.S.C. § 49. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
143. See KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 13-14; Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 before the
Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 264-269 (1975) (statement
of Philip A. Lacovara, former Counsel to the Watergate Special Prosecutor). For general discussion of the "case and controversy" requirement with respect to Article III courts, see P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL. SYSTEM 64-214 (2d ed. 1973). [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
144. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
145. Id.
146. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530
(1962); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note
143, at 309-365.
147. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962).
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to article III, the division may, when so designated by Congress, exercise the appointment powers granted to the courts of law by article II.

B.

Separation of Powers Objections

Apart from challenging the constitutionality of the statutory
mechanism for appointing the special prosecutor,l 48 critics have raised
a second, broader claim of unconstitutionality - also based on the
separation of powers doctrine - regarding the degree to which the
Ethics Act insulates the prosecutor from the President's control.
Specifically, opponents of the law contend that the prosecutorial power
belongs solely to the executive branch, and "neither Congress nor the
courts can interfere with it in any particular." 149 Thus, it is argued,
insofar as the Ethics Act restricts the executive's power to remove the
special prosecutor, 1 so and makes the special prosecutor directly accountable to a court of law rather than the attorney general, the Act violates
principles of separation of powers.
The powers possessed by the federal government are divided and
148. See supra text accompanying notes 119-140.
149. KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 9. See also /981 Hearings, supra note S. Proponents
of this position rely heavily on United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965), which, they argue, held expressly that prosecutorial power belongs solely to
the executive branch. Yet this characterization of the Cox case is erroneous. The issue before
the en bane Fifth Circuit in Cox was whether a United States Attorney could be held in contempt
for failing to comply with a court order directing him to prepare and to sign particular indictments. That case did not involve the appointment of a prosecutor by the courts, but a directive
from the court that the prosecutor perform his duties in a particular manner. Further, a majority
of the Cox court expressly ruled that the court could order the prosecutor to draft a particular
indictment, 342 F.2d at 181. Finally, although the Cox court did rule that the court could not
compel the prosecutor to sign the indictment, the judge whose concurrence provided a majority
on that issue based his ruling on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, i.e., the unlimited
discretion of the prosecutor under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss indictments once issued. 342 F.2d at 182 (Brown, J., concurring). See generally Note, supra note 136,
at 1695 (reasoning of Cox is unpersuasive and should no longer be followed). For additional
criticism of those relying on Cox, see infra text accompanying notes 167-176.
150. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. The argument made here is that restricting the executive's removal power interferes with the proper functioning of the executive branch.
Proponents of this position rely on Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), (statute limiting
President's power to remove postmasters held unconstitutional). Yet recent cases have limited
the Myers holding. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (the
President cannot remove a member of a quasi-judicial or quasi-administrative independent
regulatory agency in violation of federal statutory restrictions); Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349 (1958) (President denied the right to remove a War Claims Commission appointee,
despite the absence of express congressional restriction on removal, because the Commissioner's
task required freedom from executive interference); Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250 (1981)
(President cannot remove at will officers of the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission). For general discussion of the president's removal power, see E. CORWIN. THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 56-58 (1927); Cross, The Removal Power
of the President and the Test of Responsibility, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 81 (1954). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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allocated among the three co-equal branches of government. 151 It has
never been entirely clear, however, just how independent the Founding Fathers intended the branches of government to be. Primarily two
schools of thought have shaped analysis under the separation of powers
doctrine. 152 James Wilson, one of the Framers of the Constitution,
is frequently .associated with the rigid "isolationist position." 153 Wilson
argued that the independence of each branch requires that it "should
be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of
the other two powers." 154 In contrast, James Madison was the leading
proponent of a less rigid approach. 155 Madison argued that, at bottom, the separation of powers doctrine is intended to prevent the undue accumulation of power in one branch of government to the detriment of the others, thus disrupting the delicate checks and balances
of the constitutional scheme. Madison described this principle well in
the Federalist Papers, 156 where he defended the degree to which the
Constitution blends the powers of the three branches. In his view it
was only "[w]here the whole power of one department is exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, [that] the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted.'' 157
Over time, the Madisonian view has come to predominate. 158 The
Supreme Court has recognized that a rigid interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine is ''inconsistent with the origins of that doctrine, recent decisions of the Court, and the contemporary realities of
our political system." 159 The Court has concluded that "a hermetic
sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another
would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing
itself effectively." 160 According to Justice Jackson's classic formulation, the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 161 This "more pragmatic, flex151. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881); Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
152. See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 100 (1971). See generally M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967).
153. See generally]. ANDREWS, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (1896).
154. Id. at 367.
155. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison); R. NEUSfADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960).
See also Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "the Separation of Powers", 2 U. CHI.
L. REV. 385 (1934).
156. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, No. 48 (J. Madison).
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 325-26 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed.) (emphasis in original).
158. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
159. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977).
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 121 (1976).
161. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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ible approach" to separation of powers adopted by the Court is set
forth in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 162 and Buckley
v. Valeo. 163 In these recent cases, the Court urged that resolution of
separation of powers questions must ''be fixed according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination." 164
Insofar as the central purpose of the separation of powers doctrine
is to "safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other," 165 the doctrine is breached only
when the act of one branch prevents another branch ''from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 166
Such usurpation does not result from the Ethics Act. The special
prosecutor law does not pose any threat to the executive branch and
does not diminish the "separateness" ~f that branch's powers. The
law does not take the power of criminal prosecution away from the
executive branch and lodge it in another; it turns neither legislators
nor judges into prosecutors. 161 Rather, in a narrow category of cases,
the law merely insulates the prosecutorial power within the executive
branch from the threat of real or apparent improper influence and
conflict of interest. Moreover, it is illogical to argue that the statutory
delegation of authority to a special prosecutor usurps executive
functions. 168 The Supreme Court has recognized not only that a special
162. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
163. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
164. Id. at 122, quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122.
166. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
167. Notwithstanding appointment of the special prosecutor by the courts, the law clearly·
does not turn the courts into prosecutors. The division of the District of Columbia Circuit empowered to appoint special prosecutors may define the prosecutor's jurisdiction, but has no control over the investigatory actions or prosecutorial decisions made by the prosecutor. The court
has no more - or no less - control over the special prosecutor than any court has over any
United States Attorney or other prosecutor. The Ethics Act thus respects the important distinction between appointment to, and actual administration of, an office, vesting appointment in
the courts but reserving administration for the prosecutor. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at
398 (contrasting actual judicial administration of federal pension claims with mere judicial appointment of inferior executive branch officers); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 913 (1967)
(contrasting judicial administration of schools with judicial appointment of school board members).
168. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 (1978) ("Thus the Executive Branch
is not an indivisible entity with a single head even for prosecutorial purposes; even the core
executive mission of enforcing federal law be internally fragmented pursuant to congressional
delegations and executive subdelegations."). More recently, the Court found that Congress could
limit presidential control over members of the Federal Election Commission, an agency exercising, inter a/ia, civil law enforcement functions of the kind "usually performed by . . . some
department in the Executive Branch .... " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 141 (1976). The Court
said, "[T]he President may not insist that such functions be delegated to an appointee of his
who is removable at will." Id. In that case, as here, there were strong policy reasons favoring
insulation of the law enforcement agency from close presidential supervision. Cf discussion of
United States v. Cox supra note 149, and discussion of removal power supra note 150. See also
supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussion of state court encroachment on prosecutorial
discretion).
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prosecutor may operate and perform prosecutorial functions independently of the President if authorized by law, 169 but that even when
fully independent of the President's control, the special prosecutor is
nonetheless a member of the executive branch, performing an executive
function. 110
Indeed, the law furthers rather than impedes the functioning of the
executive branch in its duty faithfully to enforce the law. By ensuring
that the executive branch is able to enforce the law fairly in precisely
those cases where fairness is threatened by conflict of interest, the law
is fully consistent with the goals and functions of the executive branch.
The special prosecutor law guarantees the independence of the investigation and prosecution of high executive officials and ensures that
prosecutorial decisions will be made on the basis of merit rather than
partiality or favoritism. Moreover, the law instills public confidence
in those prosecutorial decisions which, if made by the Attorney General,
might be met with skepticism and mistrust. 171
Finally, even if the operation of the special prosecutor law divests
the President of some control over what traditionally have been executive functions, the law is not inconsistent with the constitutional standard governing separation of powers set forth in Nixon and Buckley.
"Common sense and the inherent necessities of . . . governmental
coordination" 172 plainly support the constitutionality of the special prosecutor law. To say that the President, as head of the executive branch,
is charged with controlling the government's prosecutorial functions
does not, as a constitutional principle, rigidly require the President
to control the prosecution of his own wrojlgdoings or those of his close
associates. Such inflexible thinking is precisely what the Supreme Court
has cautioned against in this area. 173 To permit the President to appoint or remove 114 a special prosecutor where high officials in the executive branch have been implicated in illegal activities would risk triggering the same loss of public faith in the national government that
169. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-95 (1974).
170. Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 19-34.
One commentator has argued that the most important of the special prosecutor's functions
constitutionally "need not be carried out under executive control." See Note, supra note I 36,
at 1698-99. At the core of this claim is the contention that the prosecutor's activities can be
divided into '"executive' and 'investigative' functions." Id. Prosecutorial functions generally
held under executive control include "decisions to go forward with prosecution," the granting
of witness immunity, and plea bargaining. Id. The investigative functions of the prosecutor,
on the other hand, are firmly rooted in the grand jury - traditionally an independent body.
Id. at 1700-01. Thus, insofar as the special prosecutor's primary function is to investigate the
executive, control over his activities should be kept independent of the executive branch.
172. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122, quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
406 (1928).
173. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
174. See discussion of removal power supra note 150.
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crippled the country during the Watergate scandal. 175 Surely the "functional" view of the separation of powers established by the Nixon Court
is designed to allow the "mixing" of the branches of government in
precisely this type of situation where the potential for abuse of power
threatens the proper operation of government. 176
In sum, the principal error made by critics of the special prosecutor
law is their attempt to transform separation of powers as a general
approach to the structure of government into a rigid rule of absolute
application. The necessary corollary of this position is that the President must retain the power to oversee and control the government's
prosecution in all cases, even if that prosecution is directed against
himself, his friends, or. his close associates. In fact, the separation of
powers doctrine is not so inflexible. The Constitution does not compel
such a plainly illogical result. 177
CONCLUSION

The special prosecutor law is, fundamentally, a pragmatic law. It
is addressed to real experiences, not hypothetical fears. It evolved directly
out of a prolonged national scandal that exposed the full potential for
175. See supra text accompanying notes 9-34.
Critics have argued that, accepting the need for the law and its constitutionality, the special
prosecutor provisions are "an odd solution to the 'problem'" because "if the Attorney General
wishes to thwart the due administration of justice, he may easily do so ... by finding the matter
'unsubstantial' after his preliminary investigation." KRATT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 15. This argument, however, is flawed in two respects. First, as a general matter, allegations of wrongdoing
by high executive officials are likely to attract extensive press coverage. This close scrutiny by
the national press acts as an effective check on any attempt by an Attorney General to avoid
appointing a special prosecutor. Second, the Attorney General must have some means of weeding
out frivolous allegations. Indeed, those now criticizing the law used this argument to push for
the inclusion of an even more flexible "triggering" mechanism than in the original version of
the law. See generally 1981 Hearings, supra note 5.
176. See generally Nixon, 433 U.S. 125 (1980); Scigliano, Inquisitorial Proceedings and Separations of Functions: the Case of the Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U. DET. L.J. 82, 84-86,
89 (1960) (mixing of branches of government is permissible where abuse of power prevented).
Indeed, state courts have long recognized that where one branch has fallen short of public expectations or has failed to remain accountable to both the public and the law, it may be necessary
for another branch to provide a remedy. See Note, supra note 123, at 584-86. In one sense
the special prosecutor law merely codifies this well-accepted view of the separation of powers:
it identifies a situation that practical experience has taught will always present a fundamental
conflict of interest for members of one branch, and then enlists the aid of another branch to
vitiate that threat, as a matter of law.
177. As one distinguished lawyer stated in a letter to the Senate Committee considering the
original law, "One cannot read the Constitution as forcing us to tolerate conflicts of interest
on the part of the President, the Attorney General, and their immediate assistants that we cannot, and do not; tolerate in mere judges and lawyers." Watergate Reorganization and Reform
Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 & S. 2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations,
94th Cong., !st Sess. 206, 212 (copy of speech by Lloyd N. Cutler, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
Washington, D.C., enclosed with letter of March 13, 1975, from Cutler to Senators Ribicoff
and _Percy).
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corruption and conflict of interest in those very executive branch officials whose primary duty is to enforce the law. As a pragmatic response
to a constitutional crisis, the law must be viewed with an eye toward
its purposes and its justifications. In furthering, not usurping, the ability
of the executive branch to enforce the law fully and fairly, the Ethics
Act's guarantees of independence for the special prosecutor are wholly
consistent with both the language of the Constitution and a governmental scheme of mutually interdependent branches.
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